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IMMIGRATION

The DHS Border Memo II: Removal First, Hearing Later?
By Peter Margulies

Friday, February 24, 2017, 2:18 PM

One subject of senior U.S. of cials’ talks with Mexico on Thursday was a proposal in the recently issued DHS memo on border enforcement
that would return undocumented noncitizens to Mexico before a U.S. deportation hearing (See Memo Part H, p. 7). News reports have
indicated that U.S. of cials plan to use this approach to send nationals from Central American states back to Mexico if those individuals
have entered the U.S. along the southern border. However, there are serious legal problems with this pre-hearing return proposal, including
problems under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
In fairness to DHS, the return- rst/hearing-later idea originated with Congress, which provided some authority to this effect in the INA at 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C). This subsection’s language permits return to “contiguous” countries that share a border with the United States.
Technically, the language would include Canada, but in immigration practice, it refers to Mexico. Once returned, the DHS memo envisions a
noncitizen participating in his or her removal hearing via “video teleconference” with an Immigration Judge (IJ) in the U.S. Department of
Justice.
At rst blush, the return- rst/hearing-later idea seems counterintuitive. Generally, a signi cant action such as return from the U.S. to
another country would call rst for a hearing to determine whether return was appropriate. In the criminal context, the U.S. usually doesn’t
sentence defendants rst, and try them later. Nevertheless, reversing this default setting would reap bene ts for DHS. The pre-hearing
return option reduces the need for detention capacity in the United States: if noncitizens have already been returned to Mexico, the U.S.
government has no need to detain them. Unfortunately for DHS, the INA severely limits the return- rst provision’s utility as a x for
shortages in detention space.
The key problem for the DHS proposal is a neighboring subsection of the INA: § 1225(b)(2)(B)(ii). This subsection excludes from the returnrst option any noncitizen subject to expedited removal (ER). That statutory carve-out is crucial, because the vast majority of noncitizens
that DHS wishes to target with the return- rst option are Central Americans eligible for ER.
As I explained in my earlier post here on the DHS memo, ER replaces the adversarial IJ removal hearing with an inquisitorial process. As part
of the inquisitorial process, a DHS asylum of cer conducts an interview to determine whether a noncitizen has a “credible fear” of
persecution in his or her country of origin. A negative determination is subject to review by an IJ in another inquisitorial proceeding, where
the noncitizen has a chance to speak, but legal counsel has virtually no formal role. My earlier post described the procedural issues posed by
broader use of ER beyond the context of an arrest of a noncitizen at the U.S. border (for a good discussion of these issues, see Josh
Blackman’s post here). The key takeaway is that, whatever the procedural shortcomings of ER, most Central Americans arriving in the U.S. by
land claim eligibility for asylum. They are then potentially subject to ER, and thus categorically ineligible for the return- rst provision. That
statutory limitation accounts for the rarity of the return- rst provision’s use by immigration of cials prior to the new DHS memo’s attempt
torevive the concept.
For INA enthusiasts, the chain of statutory cross-references works this way: Subsection 1225(b)(2)(C)—the return- rst provision relied on by
DHS—refers to subsection 1225(b)(2)(A). Subsection (A) provides for the detention of noncitizens pending a full adversarial IJ hearing.
Section 1225(b)(2)(B(ii) modi es subsection (A) by providing that subsection (A) does not apply to noncitizens addressed in subsection
1225(b)(1). Still with me? Subsection 1225(b)(1) in turn provides that ER, not the full adversarial removal hearing before an IJ referred to in
subsection (A), is the appropriate procedure for noncitizens arriving in the U.S. without formal admission by immigration of cials. This
group of noncitizens includes the Central American migrants that DHS wishes to return to Mexico before their removal hearings. Thus, the
INA’s chain of cross-references makes clear that subsection 1225(b)(2)(B(ii) excludes arriving Central American migrants from the return
provision.
In theory, DHS could seek to bypass ER and the statutory carve-out in the following manner: DHS could opt for the full adversarial IJ hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. It could then use the return- rst provision to return the noncitizen to Mexico, and use video-conferencing to
conduct the hearing. However, this tactic would face formidable obstacles under both the Due Process and Suspension Clauses.
Let’s assume that a noncitizen can assert a defense to removal, such as an asylum claim. For a Central American national, establishing an
asylum claim from Mexico would be exceedingly dif cult. Obtaining access to a lawyer conversant with U.S. asylum law would be an
obstacle, as would be obtaining access to experts. Granted, video communication tools are becoming more pervasive as smart-phones
proliferate, but coverage in Mexico is still spotty and secure communications capability is rarer still. The risk of a false negative—someone

who should qualify for asylum but is adjudicated as failing the legal test—is far greater for this group than for a noncitizen remaining in the
United States. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), that heightened risk of error would tilt the balance against
pre-hearing return’s compliance with due process.
Moreover, in Nken v. Holder (2009), the Supreme Court indicated that even removal after a hearing can be problematic. The INA provides for
judicial review of removal orders in U.S. courts of appeals (8 U.S.C. § 1252). In Nken, the Court held that the INA did not divest appellate
courts of their traditional power to grant a stay pending appeal. While the stay is not automatic, it is appropriate under Nken when
necessary to prevent irreparable harm. Irreparable harm could include consequences from use of the return- rst option, such as
undermining orderly appellate review of the removal order. Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote for the Court in Nken, cited Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s concern that absent the capacity to grant a stay pending appeal, the appeal might become an “idle ceremony,” undermined by
events on the ground that made an appeal more dif cult. The government’s return of a noncitizen to Mexico prior to an initial hearing
magni es that risk.
Pre-hearing return would also raise Suspension Clause concerns. It’s unclear how a noncitizen would seek a stay of pre-hearing return,
because the INA speci es a particular path to review through federal appellate courts (see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)) and bars any other route. The
Suspension Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush, requires that the statutory path to review speci ed by
Congress constitute an adequate substitute for a petition for habeas corpus. In Boumediene, the Court applied this analysis, holding that the
statutory procedure for Guantanamo detainees seeking release was an inadequate substitute for habeas.
Similarly, the INA’s consignment of judicial review to appellate courts would not be adequate to address the prejudice caused by pre-hearing
return of noncitizens to Mexico. An appellate court would lack jurisdiction over a removal proceeding still pending before an IJ. A stay of
return pending completion of a removal hearing might thus entail ling a petition for habeas corpus in a U.S. district court. Provisions of the
INA that strip district courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions would deprive noncitizens of an effective remedy for prejudice they would
suffer because of pre-hearing return. Those provisions would not provide an adequate substitute for habeas, and would therefore clash with
the Suspension Clause. (A writ of mandamus to the appeals court might be available to stop a pre-hearing return. That remedy is also not
authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). However, a court might hold that authority to grant a writ of mandamus is an inherent power of
appellate courts preserved by the Judiciary Act of 1789, like the power to grant a stay pending appeal in Nken v. Holder.)
Until now, such Due Process and Suspension Clause questions have rarely arisen. The government has usually waited for a nal order of
removal entered after an IJ hearing (or, in the case of expedited review, for IJ review of a DHS removal decision). The pre-hearing return
proposed in the DHS memo raises the question squarely. That question might be moot, in light of Mexican of cials’ coolness to the returnrst tactic. Mexico has no legal duty to accept the return of Central Americans who merely used Mexico as a transit route for entry into the
United States. However, even if Mexico eases its opposition, expanded DHS use of the return- rst provision would still face barriers under
both the Constitution and the INA, setting the stage for further legal setbacks for the new administration.
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